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ously keeping the monetary incentives to spend effort constant. The first ex-
periment shows that subjects spend significantly more effort in duopolistic and
oligopolistic markets than in a monopoly. The second experiment focuses on so-
cial comparisons as one potential mechanism for this effect. It shows that com-
petition turns the effort decisions of competing managers into strategic comple-
ments.
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1 Introduction
How does competition as measured by the number of firms in a market affect the incent-
ives to reduce costs and to increase productivity? The theoretical IO literature finds that
“increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm”
(Vives, 2008). However, the empirical literature on this topic is far from conclusive. Many
empirical studies suggest that there is a positive or inverted U-shaped relationship between
the degree of competition and measures of cost reduction and productivity. One possible
explanation for these findings is that there are non-monetary incentives provided by com-
petition that have been ignored by the theoretical literature so far.
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to identify non-monetary incentive effects
of competition. We focus on the incentives of the managers of the firms to invest effort
in cost reduction. Our hypothesis is that the number of competitors has a direct positive
incentive effect that is independent of the monetary incentives provided by competition.
This countervailing effect may contribute to the explanation for why a positive association
between competition and effort incentives is often observed.
We conduct two experiments in which we change the number of competitors exogen-
ously keeping the monetary incentives to spend effort constant. In the first experiment
(with simultaneous investments) we compare a monopoly to a duopoly and to an oligo-
poly with four firms. Competition has a highly significant causal effect on behavior. We
find that our experimental subjects engage in significantly more effort in the treatments
with competition than in the monopoly treatment. Furthermore, effort falls slightly (but
non-significantly) in the oligopoly treatment as compared to the duopoly treatment. Com-
bined with the negative effect on monetary incentives this is consistent with the sometimes
observed inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and incentives.
In this experiment the monetary incentives for a manager to invest in cost reduction
are kept constant in equilibrium. However, because subjects do not behave as predicted by
Nash equilibrium, the actual monetary incentives to provide effort are not identical across
treatments. In fact, as the number of competitors changes several other dimensions of the
decision environment change as well. In the monopoly treatment each subject has to choose
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his effort level playing against nature. This is a one-person decision problem with object-
ively given probabilities. In the duopoly and oligopoly treatments several players interact
strategically. Thus, subjects have to form beliefs about the strategies taken by their oppon-
ents. The decision problem with competition is also more complex because it involves more
possible contingencies. Furthermore, with competition there is social interaction with one
or more other managers. Subjects may care about the payoffs that their opponents receive,
and they may react to each other. The optimal strategy depends on the (possibly mistaken)
beliefs about the strategies of their opponents and on their (possibly social) preferences.
These differences are natural. In the real world an increase of the number of competitors
necessarily affects all of these dimensions as well.
In our second experiment we zoom in on the role of social interaction. We control for
all differences between a monopolistic and a duopolistic market except for the scope for
social comparisons. In the duopoly there is a second person (the competitor) to whom the
manager can compare himself, which is not the case in a monopoly situation. The beha-
vioral and experimental literature proposes two mechanisms by which social comparisons
may affect behavior. First, models of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) and envy (Bolton, 1991) claim that people suffer a utility loss if they fall
behind. Second, the literature on contests and auctions claims that there is a “joy of win-
ning” that explains overbidding (Cox et al., 1992; Sheremeta, 2010). Both types of models
predict that subjects have an incentive to invest more cost reducing effort in a duopoly than
in a monopoly, but they differ in their predictions on whether effort choices are strategic
complements or substitutes.
In this second experiment we achieve control over all other factors by making in-
vestments sequential. In the duopoly treatment the second duopolist observes the effort
choice of the first duopolist, so there is no strategic uncertainty at the second stage. In
the monopoly treatment the monopolist also faces exogenous uncertainty about “market
conditions”. An increase of the effort chosen by the first duopolist in the duopoly treat-
ment corresponds to an increase of the probability of unfavorable market conditions in the
monopoly treatment. The experiment is designed such that the monopolist and the second
duopolist face exactly the same decision problem with the same information structure, the
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same probabilities and the same monetary payoffs. In fact, they both have the same dom-
inant strategy (i.e., their optimal strategies are independent of market conditions and of
what the first duopolist does). The only difference is that in the duopoly treatment there is
a second player with whom the duopolist interacts, while there is no social interaction in
the monopoly treatment.
We find that the average effort level chosen by subjects in the duopoly treatment is
again higher than in the monopoly treatment, but the difference is no longer statistically
significant. Thus, social comparisons alone cannot explain the strong effect observed in the
first experiment. However, in the duopoly treatment there is a strong (and highly signific-
ant) positive reaction of the second duopolist to the effort chosen by the first duopolist, i.e.
efforts are strategic complements which is consistent with models of inequity aversion and
envy, but not with a “joy of winning”. In contrast, in the monopoly treatment an increase
in the probability of non-favorable market conditions (which is payoff equivalent to an in-
crease in the effort of the first duopolist) has a negative effect on the effort chosen by the
monopolist. Thus, more effort of their competitors induces subjects to work harder, while
more challenging market conditions in a monopoly induces them to be more complacent.
We conducted our experimental study in a lab environment which offers several ad-
vantages over field studies. First, in our experiments we can change the number of com-
petitors exogenously. This allows us to identify causal effects. In contrast, in field studies
it is difficult to identify causal effects because the number of competitors in a market is en-
dogenous and causality can go in both directions. While the number of competitors affects
the incentives to invest in cost reduction, the productivity of firms also affects entry and
exit decisions. Second, by using the induced value method we can control for the monet-
ary incentive effects of competition (the costs and the returns of the effort invested) which
is much more difficult in an empirical study. Finally, we can eliminate potential selection
biases that often plague empirical studies. For example, many monopolistic companies are
either state-owned or tightly regulated, thus exhibiting different wage and pension systems
than competitive firms. Therefore, they may attract managers and workers with different
characteristics than companies acting under competitive pressure. In our experiments sub-
jects are randomly assigned to treatments, so there is no self-selection of individuals into
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more or less competitive markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation to
the literature. In Section 3 we set up a simple theoretical model of the monetary incentive
effects of competition (as measured by the number of firms in the market) for managers
to invest in cost reduction. Section 4 reports on our first experiment with simultaneous in-
vestments and strategic uncertainty. We describe the experimental design in subsection 4.1,
derive the theoretical hypotheses in subsection 4.2 and report the experimental results in
subsection 4.3. Section 5 discusses the second experiment with sequential investments that
focuses on the effects of social comparisons. The experimental design, described in Sub-
section 5.1, is such that decision makers in the monopoly and the duopoly treatment face
exactly the same decision problem (except for the presence of a second duopolist). The the-
oretical predictions are derived in Subsection 5.2. We report the results of this experiment
in Subsection 5.3. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper is closely related to two strands of literature—the theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on competition and innovation and the experimental literature on contests and
competition.
The theoretical literature on competition, investment incentives, and innovation goes
back at least to Schumpeter (1942) who argued that monopolies will invest more in innov-
ation and Arrow (1962) who argued that the incentives for innovation are stronger with
competition. One problem of this literature is that a change in the degree of competition can
mean very different things: a change of the number of competitors, a change of the degree
of product substitutability, a change from Bertrand to Cournot competition, or a change in
regulation or in barriers to entry. Here we focus on just one aspect of competition, the num-
ber of firms in the market. In a comprehensive study Vives (2008) compares many different
models of competition (Bertrand and Cournot, with free and restricted entry, and with dif-
ferent demand systems such as linear, CES, Logit, etc.). He concludes that increasing the
number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditures per firm.
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While this literature looks at the incentives of firms to invest in cost reduction, we
are mainly interested in the incentives of managers who are maximizing their own utility.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the degree of competition cannot affect managerial
incentives because a monopolist has the same incentives to minimize costs and to reduce
agency costs as a competitive firm, so both types of firm should offer the same incentive
scheme. However, this argument ignores that competition changes the environment in
which the firm operates and thereby the optimal incentive scheme. There are a few agency
models investigating how the effects of competition on firm profits translate into mana-
gerial incentives (Martin, 1993; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003).We show in Section 3 that the
incentives of the owner to reduce costs are translated monotonically via the optimal incent-
ive scheme into the monetary incentives of the manager to invest effort into cost reduction.
Thus, if an increase in the number of firms decreases the incentives of the firm to invest in
cost reduction, then the monetary incentives of the manager of the firm will also decrease.1
Most empirical studies find either that measures of innovation and productivity in-
crease monotonically with the degree of competition as measured by a concentration index
(Geroski, 1994; Nickell, 1996; Blundell et al., 1999) or that there is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between competition and incentives (Scherer and Ross, 1990).2 More recently
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), using a survey of management practices of medium-sized
firms in the U.S., France, Germany, and the U.K., show that competition measured by the
number of competitors strongly increases managerial effort and managerial performance.
However, an important problem of all of these studies is that entry and exit are endogenous
which makes it difficult to establish a causal impact of competition on behavior.
There is also a small experimental literature on the relationship between competition
and innovation. Isaac and Reynolds (1992) compare a monopoly to an oligopoly with four
firms and find a positive effect of competition on cost-reducing R&D investments. Darai
et al. (2010) consider two different measures of the degree of competition. A change from
Cournot to Bertrand competition increases cost-reducing investments in their experiments,
1There is another branch of the literature focussing on the additional information that is provided by ad-
ditional competitors (Holmström, 1982; Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988). This additional information is always
beneficial for the principal, but whether it results in a higher effort level of the manager depends on the
informational structure of the model.
2See Gilbert (2006) and Vives (2008) for overviews of this literature.
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while an increase from two to four players in a Cournot setting leads to lower average
investments. In Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) the degree of competition is varied by the
degree of product differentiation. They find weak experimental evidence for a U-shaped
relationship between competition and innovation. In all of these papers changes in the
degree of competition change the monetary incentives to invest. Thus, these papers cannot
disentangle the monetary effects and the non-monetary effects of competition. This is a
novel contribution of our paper.
Finally our paper is related to the experimental literature on contests and tournaments.
Most experimental studies find that there is a negative relationship between the number
of players and individual effort, as predicted by theory.3 The experimental literature has
also shown that the rent dissipation rate (total effort divided by the prize) is significantly
higher than predicted by Nash equilibrium, i.e. contestants spend too much effort.4 In our
experiments we also find that subjects overinvest. Furthermore, similar to these studies,
we find a high variation in individual investments. However, in contrast to this literature,
in our setting the “prize” is not fixed but determined endogeneously on the market, and
we focus on changes in the degree of competition keeping monetary incentives constant.
3 Monetary Incentives to Reduce Costs
There is a widespread consensus that an increase in the number of competitors on a given
market reduces the incentives of each individual firm to engage in cost reduction. In a
comprehensive survey, Vives (2008, p. 423) summarizes this as follows:
“Increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditures per firm.
In Bertrand the result holds for all leading examples (including linear, constant elasti-
city, constant expenditure, and logit demand systems). In Cournot the result holds in
the usual case of outputs being strategic substitutes.”
3See e.g. Sheremeta (2011) and Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006). Dechenaux et al. (2015) offer a detailed
overview of this literature.
4In a recent study Sheremeta (2015) shows that overbidding is correlated with various personal character-
istics, in particular with impulsive behavior. Other related papers on overbidding in contests include Price
and Sheremeta (2011) and Brookins and Ryvkin (2014).
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. The direct effect of an increase in the
number of firms is that the market share of each firm is reduced which makes a cost reduc-
tion less profitable. There is also an indirect effect, however, that may work in the opposite
direction. Given the costs of all other firms, the cost reduction of one firm leads to an in-
crease of this firm’s market share. Depending on the elasticity of demand this increase in
market share may become larger (or smaller) as the number of competitors increases. But
this indirect effect is (almost) always dominated by the direct effect.
Vives (2008) refers to models in which the firm’s owner chooses how much to invest
in cost reduction. In this paper we are interested in the incentives of the manager of the
firm (who maximizes his own utility rather than firm’s profits) to spend effort in order
to implement the cost reduction. The manager has to be induced to spend effort by an
incentive scheme offered by the firm’s owner. Thus, the question is how the optimal in-
centive scheme and thereby the optimal effort level of the manager changes as the number
of competitors increases.
Consider a simple model that motivates the experiments described in the following
sections. There are n ≥ 1 firms each with an initial cost parameter cH. Suppose first that
the owner of each firm chooses an effort level that determines the probability with which
a cost reduction to cL, cL < cH, will be successful. Let EΠH(n) (EΠL(n)) denote the firm’s
gross expected profit if there are n ≥ 1 competitors in the market and if the firm’s cost
parameter is cH (cL, respectively). For simplicity we assume that the effort cost function is





The owner chooses p to maximize
max
p









5It is straightforward to generalize the following analysis to the case of a general convex cost function. See
Schmidt (1997).
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Thus, the owner chooses a higher effort level the smaller larger EΠL(n)− EΠH(n), i.e.
the larger the expected value of a cost reduction. As the number of firms n in the market
increases, the cost reducing effort of each owner is reduced if and only if for all n ≥ 1
EΠL(n)− EΠL(n) > EΠL(n + 1)− EΠL(n + 1) . (4)
Vives (2008) shows that in (almost) all models of competition an increase in the number of
firms reduces the expected value of a cost reduction and thereby the incentives of each firm
to invest.
Suppose now that the owner does not choose the effort himself but hires a manager to
do this. The manager is assumed to be risk neutral and wealth-constrained. The optimal
incentive scheme for the manager is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
p,wL,wH
p[EΠL(n)− wL] + (1 − p)[EΠH(n)− wH] (5)
subject to
p ∈ arg max
p′∈[0,1]




pwL + (1 − p)wH −
K
2
p2 ≥ 0 , (PC)
wL, wH ≥ 0 . (WC)
The solution to this problem is straightforward. Replacing the incentive constraint (IC)
by the first order condition of the manager’s maximization problem we get p = (w
L−wH)
K .
Substituting p in the agent’s participation constraint shows that (PC) is always satisfied if
the wealth constraint (WC) holds. The principal wants to minimize the rent that has to





















This result shows that the effort of the manager, pM, is smaller than the efficient ef-
fort level, p∗, that the owner would choose himself. More importantly, both effort levels
increase monotonically with the expected value of a cost reduction. Thus, if the value of a
cost reduction decreases as the number of competitors goes up, then both, the effort chosen
by the owner and the effort chosen by the manager decrease.
4 Non-monetary Incentives with Simultaneous Investments
In the following we focus on non-monetary incentive effects that may arise as the number
of competitors in a market increases keeping monetary incentives constant. We consider
a laboratory experiment of a market that is served by either one, two or four firms. From
the previous section we know that the monetary incentives for cost reduction go down as
the number of firms increases. Thus, to cleanly identify the non-monetary effects of com-
petition we adjust the incentive scheme of the manager such that his monetary incentives
to invest in cost reduction are kept constant (in equilibrium). Thus, if we observe different
effort levels in the different treatments they must be due to non-monetary effects.
4.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
Consider a manager who has to decide how much costly effort to invest into a risky project
that may reduce the firm’s cost. The more he invests the higher is the probability that
the cost reduction is successful which increases the profits of his firm. The manager has a
monetary incentive to spend costly effort because his compensation is tied to the profits of
his company.
We compare three treatments: In the MONOPOLY treatment there is only one manager
and one firm. The firm’s profit depends only on whether its manager is successful in redu-
cing costs. In the DUOPOLY treatment there are two firms and two managers. Each firm’s
profit depends not only on the effort of its own manager, but also on the success (or failure)
of the competing firm. Finally, in the OLIGOPOLY treatment four firms are competing with
each other and the profit of each firm depends on the success of its own manager and on
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how many other firms have been successful.
In order to keep the monetary incentives constant across treatments we chose the bo-
nus payments that the manager receives as a function of the profit of his firm such that
in the unique Nash equilibrium a risk neutral manager chooses the same effort level in all
treatments. Note that in the experiment managers compete only by choosing their effort
levels. Product market competition is modeled in reduced form and affects the managers’
decision problems only via their payoff functions.
In all treatments subjects receive a show-up fee and an initial endowment to cover
potential losses. Each manager i has to chose a discrete effort level ei. The larger his effort,
the larger is the probability that his project is successful. The cost of effort is linear and
given by c(ei) = 2 · ei. The benefit of effort is an increased probability of success. Table 1
shows the relationship between investment and probability of success.6
Effort e 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Probability of success (in %) p(e) 0 27 39 47 55 61 67 73 78 83 86
Table 1: Relationship between effort and probability of success
The sequence of events is as follows. In each period managers have to choose their
effort levels simultaneously. A random mechanism determines success or failure of each
firm according to the chosen probabilities. In the MONOPOLY treatment the manager learns
whether he was successful and what his payoff in this period is. In the two competition
treatments the manager learns about his own success and whether the competing managers
have been successful and what the monetary payoffs of each of the competing managers
are.
In all treatments, the game is repeated over 20 periods. In the DUOPOLY and OLI-
GOPOLY treatments subjects are randomly re-matched in each period. We use a between-
subject design in which each participant participates in only one treatment. Before the
experiment began, the instructions were read aloud and the subjects had to answer sev-
6The numbers in the table have been derived from the quadratic function e(p) = 133.3p2. Note also that
the maximal probability of success is 86%, so success cannot be guaranteed.
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eral control questions.7 After the last period, subjects answered questions regarding their
risk, loss and ambiguity aversion, and filled in a standard questionnaire with demographic
information.8
We conducted the experiments at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of the Uni-
versity of Munich in 2012/13. We had two sessions per treatment with 20-24 subjects in
each session.9 A total of 130 subjects participated in the experiments. In each duopoly
treatment we had three matching groups with six subjects each and one matching group
with four subjects. In each oligopoly treatment we had one matching group with 12 and
one with 8 subjects. About 61% of all participants were female and the average age was
24.6 years. Sessions lasted for about 75 minutes. Subjects were paid their earnings of all
periods plus the outcome of the subsequent tests. On average subjects earned EUR 19.64
(about USD 26 at the time of the experiment), including a show-up fee of EUR 4. During
the experiment payoffs where expressed in points (500 points = 1 Euro).
4.2 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
In this section we derive the optimal effort choices in the experiments assuming that man-
agers are fully rational, only interested in their own monetary payoff, and risk neutral.
MONOPOLY Treatment
In the MONOPOLY treatment the monetary payoff function of the manager is given by
Π
M = 310 + BM − 2e (9)
7The instructions of the experiment are included in the Online Appendix.
8The test used forf the elicitation of risk aversion is based on Dohmen et al. (2010) and Holt and Laury
(2002), the test for loss aversion is based on Gaechter et al. (2010) and Fehr and Goette (2007) and the test
for ambiguity aversion is a modified version of Ederer and Manso (2013). For each participant one of these
lotteries was randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. The tests can be found in the Online
Appendix.
9The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were re-
cruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
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0 if no success
(10)
Thus, the managers expected payoff is
EΠM(e) = 310 + 290p(e)− 2e. (11)
Lemma 1. The optimal effort level in the MONOPOLY treatment is given by eM = 40.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
DUOPOLY Treatment
In the DUOPOLY treatment the payoff of manager i depends not only on his own success,
but also on whether the competing firm is successful or not. He gets the highest payoff if
he is the only one who is successful. If both managers are successful his payoff is higher
than if no manager is successful. His payoff is lowest if the other firm is successful while
he is not. In the experiment manager i’s payoff function is given by
Π
D
i = 210 + B
D
i − 2ei , (12)















480 if i succeeds and j fails
200 if i and j both succeed
80 if i and j both fail
0 if j succeeds and i fails
(13)
Thus, manager i’s expected monetary payoff is given by
EΠD(ei, ej) = 210 + 480p(ei)(1 − p(ej)) + 200p(ei)p(ej) + 80(1 − p(ei))(1 − p(ej))− 2ei.
(14)
The two managers have to choose their effort levels independently. Note that effort levels
are strategic substitutes, i.e., the more manager j invests the smaller is the investment in-
centive for manager i.
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Lemma 2. The unique Nash equilibrium in the DUOPOLY treatment is for each manager i, i ∈
{1, 2}, to choose eDi = 40.
OLIGOPOLY Treatment
Finally, in the OLIGOPOLY treatment there are four managers competing with each other.
The monetary payoff of each manager i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is given by
Π
O
i = 210 + B
O
i − 2ei , (15)
where the bonus payments BOi depend on the success and failure of manager i and on how



























760 if i succeeds and all others fail
350 if i and one other manager succeed
190 if i and two other managers succeed
90 if all managers succeed
40 if all managers fail
0 if i fails and at least one other manager succeeds
(16)
Thus, manager i’s expected monetary payoff is given by
EΠOi (ei, ej, ek, el) = 210 + 760 · [pi(1 − pj)(1 − pk)(1 − pl)]
+ 350 · [pi pj(1 − pk)(1 − pl) + pi pk(1 − pj)(1 − pl) + pi pl(1 − pj)(1 − pk)]
+190 · [pi pj pk(1 − pl) + pi pl pk(1 − pj) + pi pj pl(1 − pk)]
+90 · [pi pj pk pl + 40 · (1 − pi)(1 − pj)(1 − pk)(1 − pl)− 2ei. (17)
Again, the investments of the four managers are strategic substitutes.
Lemma 3. The unique Nash equilibrium in the OLIGOPOLY treatment is for each manager i, i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} to choose ei = 40.
Lemmas 1 to 3 show that the optimal investment in the MONOPOLY treatment and
the Nash equilibrium investments in the DUOPOLY and in the OLIGOPOLY treatment are
identical. Thus, the standard neoclassical theory that considers only monetary incentive
effects gives rise to the following hypothesis:
13
Hypothesis 1. In the MONOPOLY, DUOPOLY and OLIGOPOLY treatments subjects have the same
incentives to invest and choose the same effort level of ei = 40.
4.3 Results
Comparing the average effort levels over all periods across treatments shows significant
differences between treatments and large deviations from the Nash equilibrium predic-
tion. The average effort level in the MONOPOLY treatment is 50.4 points. In the DUOPOLY
treatment, the average effort is 63.5 points and 59.5 points in the OLIGOPOLY treatment.
Figure 1 shows the average effort levels per treatment with 95% confidence interval error
bars. Average efforts from period 5–20 are very similar to the average over all periods.
Figure 1: Average effort invested by treatment
Result 1. In all treatments subjects invest significantly more effort than predicted by Nash equilib-
rium.
14
The result that subjects exert too much effort compared to the profit-maximising equi-
librium prediction is highly significant in all three treatments (sign tests, p-values < 0.001).
Result 2. The average effort invested in the DUOPOLY treatment and the average effort invested in
the OLIGOPOLY treatment are significantly higher than the average effort invested in the MONO-
POLY treatment.
A Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the equality of investments (on subject averages) yields
a p-value < 0.001 comparing the MONOPOLY and the DUOPOLY treatment and a p-value
of 0.0327 comparing the MONOPOLY and the OLIGOPOLY treatment. We also find that the
average investment is lower in the OLIGOPOLY treatment than in the DUOPOLY treatment
which is consistent with the often observed inverse U-shaped relationship between com-
petition and incentives. However, this difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p = 0.1517).
The treatment difference between the MONOPOLY treatment and the competition treat-
ments is also significant in an OLS regression in which we compare efforts across treat-
ments. Table 2 reports the regression results. The results of regression (1) show that sub-
jects in the DUOPOLY treatment invest on average 13.13 points more than in the MONOPOLY
treatment (p < 0.001) and that subjects in the OLIGOPOLY treatment invest 9.12 points more
than in the MONOPOLY treatment (p = 0.017).10 In regression (2) we cluster by matching
group rather than by subject, which has no effect on significance levels. Regression (3)
restricts attention to period 1, so there cannot be any effect of repeated interaction. The
results are very similar.
The treatment difference between the MONOPOLY treatment and the competition treat-
ments stays significant when we control for gender, age, risk aversion, loss aversion and ambi-
guity aversion no matter whether we cluster at the subject or matching group level (regres-
sions (4) and (5), respectively).11 The only marginally significant control variable is age,
which has a positive effect on effort. The variable period is not significant, so there is no
10The difference between the DUOPOLY and the OLIGOPOLY treatment is also not significant in an F-test of
the dummy coefficients in regression (1) of Table 2 (p = 0.3205).
11See Footnote 8 for the description of the tests we used for the elicitation of risk, loss and ambiguity
aversion (included in the Online Appendix). Points range from 0 to 10 in the risk self-assessment and 0 to 7
in the tests. Higher values imply a higher degree of aversion against risk, loss or ambiguity.
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Effort invested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Duopoly 13.13*** 13.13*** 10.05** 13.27*** 13.27***
(3.308) (2.924) (4.615) (3.438) (3.273)
Oligopoly 9.120** 9.120*** 14.66*** 9.319** 9.319***





Risk aversion 1.248 1.248
(1.266) (1.073)
Risk aversion quest. -0.671 -0.671
(0.956) (1.065)
Loss aversion 1.124 1.124
(0.984) (0.985)




Constant 50.38*** 50.38*** 46.09*** 40.44*** 40.44***
(2.161) (2.171) (2.786) (11.37) (11.03)
Restricted to period 1 yes
Clustered by sub mg sub mg
Observations 2600 2600 130 2600 2600
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.051 0.055 0.081 0.081
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors
are clustered and reported in parentheses. Clustering of standard errors by
subject (sub), matching group (mg) or session (sess) as listed. By including
dummy variables for periods, only the dummy variable for period 1 is slightly
significant. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
Table 2: Experiment 1, Determinants of effort invested
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linear time trend in the data. We also ran regressions with dummies for each period, none
of which is significant. Figure ?? in the Appendix shows average investments per treatment
over periods and also does not indicate a time trend in any of the treatments.
Based on Result 2 we can reject Hypothesis 1. Investments differ significantly between
the MONOPOLY treatment and the competition treatments. To examine the differences in
the average investments in more detail, Figure 2 displays the distribution of investments
in the R&D project. We observe that investments are dispersed over the whole range in all
treatments. Some subjects invest nothing of their endowment in the project, others invest
their whole endowment of 100 points. High investments of 80 or more points are chosen in
only 13.6% of all cases in the MONOPOLY treatment, but in 32.5% of all cases in the DUOPOLY
and in 30.1% of all cases in the OLIGOPOLY treatment. The highest possible investment was
chosen in less than 2% of all cases in the MONOPOLY treatment compared to 14.3% and




























Results 1 and 2 show that the number of firms in the market has a strong causal impact
on behavior. The degree of competition is changed exogenously and subjects are alloc-
ated randomly to treatments. Thus, we can exclude reversed causality and self-selection
effects. Managers in the competition treatments work much harder than managers in the
monopoly treatment even though they face the same monetary incentives. This strongly
confirms our hypothesis that competition has an incentive effect that goes beyond the mon-
etary incentives it provides.
What explains the difference in behavior in the monopoly and in the competition treat-
ments? In the experiment with simultaneous investments the monetary incentives to in-
vest are equal across treatments in equilibrium. However, because subjects do not follow
the Nash equilibrium prediction, the actual monetary incentives to provide effort are not
identical across treatments. In fact, as the number of competitors changes several other
dimensions of the decision environment change as well that may affect behavior.
First, decision making in the competition treatments involves strategic reasoning which
is not the case for the MONOPOLY treatment. The manager in the MONOPOLY treatment
faces exogenous uncertainty with known objective probabilities. In contrast, managers in
the competition treatments have to form beliefs about the strategies chosen by their oppon-
ents. Thus, a possible explanation for the difference in behavior could be that subjects in
the competition treatments form mistaken beliefs. However, mistaken beliefs cannot be the
full story. Recall that investments in the competition treatments are strategic substitutes
and that the average effort invested is about 60 points. For an investment level of 60 to be a
best response a subject would have to believe that the expected investment of his opponent
is below 20 in the DUOPOLY treatment and below 30 in the OLIGOPOLY treatment. If sub-
jects did believe this, they should have realized over time that this belief is mistaken, that
the actual investment levels of their opponents are much higher. Thus, they should have
lowered their own effort levels over time. However, we do not observe any time trend in
the data. Nevertheless, mistaken beliefs could have had some effect.
Second, competition makes the decision problem more complex by adding additional
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contingencies. There are only two possible payoffs in the MONOPOLY treatment but four
(six, respectively) different payoffs in the DUOPOLY (OLIGOPOLY) treatment. Furthermore,
payoffs in the competition treatments have a higher variance and expose the decision
maker to more risk. This may affect behavior if subjects are risk averse or suffer from
loss aversion. However, the regression analysis in Table 3 shows that neither risk aver-
sion nor loss aversion are significantly correlated with the chosen effort levels. Thus, it
seems unlikely that risk and/or loss aversion are driving the results, but again, the current
experiment does not allow us to rule out this possibility.
Finally, competition involves social interaction with one or several competitors which
is not the case in a monopolistic market. In the competition treatments subjects have to in-
teract with other subjects and can make social comparisons, while managers in the MONO-
POLY treatment face a one-person decision problem in social isolation. If subjects are en-
vious, inequality averse, or have any other form of social preferences this may affect their
behavior. Furthermore, the literature on contests claims that subjects spend too much effort
as compared to the Nash prediction because there is a “joy of winning”. In our experiments
subjects could “win” in all treatments, but it is possible that they enjoy winning more if they
win against another subject than if they win against nature.
In the real world all of these effects play a role. Competition involves strategic inter-
action and requires the formation of (possibly mistaken) beliefs about the strategies chosen
by the opponents, competitive situations are more complex and more risky than situations
without competition, and competition involves social comparisons. In the next section we
zoom in on one of these differences, social comparisons.
5 Non-monetary Incentives with Sequential Investments:
The Role of Social Comparisons
In this section we focus on the effects of social comparisons on the incentives to invest and
to succeed. We modify the experiment of the previous section in order to control for all
differences between monopolistic and duopolistic markets except for one: on a duopolistic
market there is always a second person (the competing manager). This is not the case in a
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monopoly. Social comparisons with the competing player may give rise to non-monetary
incentive effects for two reasons. First, a manager may suffer a utility loss if he falls behind
his competitor. For example, this is the case if the manager is inequality averse (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or if he is envious (Bolton, 1991). Second, a
manager may enjoy being ahead of his competitor. This has been modelled as a “joy of
winning” in the literature on contests (Cox et al., 1992; Sheremeta, 2010). At first glance,
these two effects seem to be very similar, but we show below that they give rise to different
predictions that can be used to discriminate between them experimentally.
The main new feature of the second experiment is that in the duopoly treatment in-
vestments take place sequentially. After manager D1 chose his effort level, manager D2
observes the effort chosen by his competitor before choosing his own effort level. Thus, D2
knows the probability with which his competitor will be successful, so he does not have to
form beliefs about it.12 Furthermore, we modify the monopoly treatment in such a way that
the decision problems in the new duopoly treatment (DUO-SEQ) and in the new monopoly
treatment (MONO-SEQ) are identical. The bonus payment of manager M in the MONO-SEQ
treatment now depends on two factors: First, on whether he is successful which depends
probabilistically on the effort he chooses, and second on whether market conditions are fa-
vorable or unfavorable. His bonus payment if he is successful and the market is favorable
is the same as the bonus payment of manager D2 in the DUO-SEQ treatment if this man-
ager is successful and manager D1 fails. His bonus payment if he is successful and market
conditions are adverse is the same as the bonus payment of manager D2 in the DUO-SEQ
treatment if both managers are successful, and so on.
In the MONO-SEQ treatment manager M knows that the probability of unfavorable mar-
ket conditions in period t is equal to pt. We conducted the DUO-SEQ treatment first and
used the probabilities chosen by the manager D1 in period t as the probability of adverse
market conditions pt in the corresponding MONO-SEQ treatment. Thus, the managers in
the MONO-SEQ treatment faced exactly the same payoffs and the same probabilities as the
corresponding second movers in the DUO-SEQ treatment. The only difference is that in the
DUO-SEQ treatment the bad state of the world is that the competing manager is success-
12Herrmann and Orzen (n.d.) use a similar method to disentangle envious preferences and strategic uncer-
tainty in an experimental Tullock contest.
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ful, while in the MONO-SEQ treatment the bad state is described as unfavorable market
conditions.
Finally, we change the bonus payments such that monetary incentives induce an op-
timal effort level that is independent of the effort chosen by the competitor (independent of
the probability of adverse market conditions, respectively). As will be shown below, envy
and inequity aversion turn social comparisons into strategic complements while a joy of
winning turns them into strategic substitutes. This gives us a neutral baseline to discrim-
inate between these models. We also simplify the decision problem of managers by letting
them choose the probabilities of success directly.
5.1 Experimental Design and Parameters
Each subject has an initial endowment of 100 points in each period. Subjects choose the
probability of success according to the function displayed in Table 3:13
Probability of success in % p 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Effort cost e 0 1 5 11 20 31 45 61 80 100
Table 3: Relationship between probability of success and effort cost
In the DUO-SEQ treatment the sequence of events in each period t is as follows: First,
manager D1 chooses his probability of success pt1 and thereby how much effort to invest.
Then manager D2 learns which probability was chosen. Finally manager D2 decides on





stochastically independent. Both managers learn the outcomes of both projects and both of
their bonus payments.
In the MONO-SEQ treatment there is only one manager M. Before choosing his effort
level in period t the manager is informed that the probability of adverse market conditions
in this period is equal to pt. We have chosen pt = pt1, i.e. equal to the probability of success
chosen by a corresponding manager D1 in the DUO-SEQ treatment in period t. Furthermore,
the bonus payments in the MONO-SEQ treatment are equal to the corresponding bonus
13The table is derived from the quadratic effort cost function e(p) = 125p2.
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payments in the DUO-SEQ treatment. Thus, the manager in the MONO-SEQ treatment faces
the same probabilities, the same payoffs, and the same information as the corresponding
manager D2 in the DUO-SEQ treatment. At the end of each period the manager learns
whether he was successful and whether market conditions were favorable or not. The
experiment runs for 20 periods with random rematching in the DUO-SEQ treatment. We
take the complete history of probabilities {pt1} of one first moving manager in the DUO-SEQ
treatment and use them as the probabilities {pt} faced by one manager M in the DUO-SEQ
treatment.
We conducted nine sessions for this experiment in 2013, three with the MONO-SEQ
treatment and six with the DUO-SEQ treatment. Between 22 and 24 subjects participated in
each session, a total of 210 subjects over all sessions. In the DUO-SEQ sessions we had either
three matching groups with eight subjects or 2 groups with 8 subjects and 1 group with 6
subjects. Half of the participants in each DUO-SEQ sessions were chosen to be first movers
(manager D1), the other ones second movers (manager D2).14 About 61% of all participants
were female and the average age was 24 years. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes. Subjects
were paid their earnings of one period chosen randomly out of the 20 periods plus the
outcome of one randomly chosen test in which we elicited subjects’ risk, loss and ambiguity
aversion.15 On average, subjects earned EUR 16.44, including a show-up fee of EUR 4.
During the experiment, payments were expressed in points (25 points = 1 Euro).
5.2 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
Monetary Incentives in the DUO-SEQ and MONO-SEQTreatments
The payoff function πDi of subject i = 1, 2 with i 6= j in the DUO-SEQ treatment is given by
Π
D
i (pi) = 100 + B
D
i − ei(pi) (18)
where the bonus payment BDi depends on manager i’s own success and on whether or not
14The experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were re-
cruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
15See Footnotes 8 and 11 for a description of these tests.
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200 if i succeeds and j fails
100 if i and j succeed
100 if i and j fail
0 if j succeeds and i fails
(19)
Thus, manager i’s expected payoff function is
EΠDi (pi, pj) = 100 + pi(1 − pj)200 + pi pj 100 + (1 − pi)(1 − pj)100 − 125p
2
i
= 200 + 100pi − 100pj − 125p
2
i (20)
The monopolistic manager M in the MONO-SEQ treatment has the exact same payoff
function. The only difference is that there is no second manager and that pj is now inter-
preted as the probability of favorable market conditions.
Note that the payoff function (20) is globally concave. Differentiating (20) with respect
to pi yields the FOC for the optimal effort level
∂ΠDi
∂pi
= 100 − 250pi = 0 (21)
which implies p∗i =
100
250 = 0.4. Thus we get:
Lemma 4. In the DUO-SEQ and the MONO-SEQ treatment it is a dominant strategy for each
manager i, i ∈ {1, 2, M}, to choose pi = 0.4.
Hence, the standard neoclassical model predicts:
Hypothesis 2. Manager D2 in the DUO-SEQ treatment and manager M in the MONO-SEQ treat-
ment choose the same effort level, p2 = p
M = 0.4. Furthermore, the effort of manager D2 is
independent of the probability of success chosen by manager D1 and the effort of manager M is
independent of the probability of unfavorable market conditions.
Non-monetary Incentives and Social Comparisons
How are the incentives of a duopolistic managers affected by social comparisons? Suppose
first that a manager in the duopoly treatment experiences a “joy of winning”, i.e. his utility
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is increased by ∆w if he is successful while his opponent fails. In this case his expected
utility is
UDi = 200 + 100pi − 100pj + pi(1 − pj)∆w − 125p
2
i (22)
Differentiating with respect to pi yields the FOC
∂UDi
∂pi
= 100 + (1 − pj)∆w − 250pi = 0 (23)
which implies
p∗i =
100 + (1 − pj)∆w
250
(24)
Note that with a joy of winning the manager no longer has a dominant strategy. His optimal
effort level is now a decreasing function of the effort level chosen by his competitor, i.e.
effort levels are strategic substitutes.
Suppose now that a manager in the duopoly treatment experiences a utility loss from
falling behind, i.e. his utility is decreased by ∆L if he fails while his opponent is successful.
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Now his expected utility is
UDi = 200 + 100pi − 100pj − (1 − pi)pj∆L − 125p
2
i (25)
Differentiating with respect to pi yields the FOC
∂UDi
∂pi






Hence, if there is a utility loss from falling behind, the manager’s optimal strategy again
depends on the effort chosen by his opponent, but now his optimal effort level is increasing
with the effort level chosen by his competitor, i.e. effort levels are strategic complements.
Thus, models of social comparison give rise to the following predictions:
16The model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that this utility loss is proportional
to the payoff difference in this state of the world, i.e. ∆L = α · 200. Furthermore, the model assumes that a
player may also dislike (to a lesser extend) inequality to his advantage, i.e. he experiences a utility loss β · 200,
0 ≤ β < α, if he is successful while his competitor fails. This model yields the same qualitative result that
effort levels are strategic complements.
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Hypothesis 3. Social comparisons have a positive non-monetary incentive effect on effort provision.
In the DUO-SEQ treatment, if managers are motivated by a joy of winning, then their efforts are
strategic substitutes, if they are motivated by a fear of falling behind, their efforts are strategic
complements.
5.3 Results
The average chosen probability of success is 53.6% for duopolist D2 in the DUO-SEQ treat-
ment and 52.6% for the monopolist in the MONO-SEQ treatment. As in the experiment with
simultaneous investments, we observe that subjects invest more than the equilibrium pre-
diction in both treatments (sign tests, p-values< 0.001). The dominant strategy of p = 0.4
is chosen in only 12.5% of all investment decisions in the MONO-SEQ treatment and in 9.5%
of all investment decisions in the DUO-SEQ treatment.
Result 3. In both treatments, subjects on average invest significantly more than predicted by Hy-
pothesis 2.
The effort chosen by the manager is higher in the DUO-SEQ treatment than in the
MONO-SEQ treatment, but the difference is small and statistically not significant. A Wil-
coxon rank-sum test on equality of the chosen probability of success in the MONO-SEQ
treatment and the DUO-SEQ treatment cannot be rejected (average over periods and sub-
jects in a treatment, p = 0.47). This is confirmed by the simple OLS regression (1) reported
in Table 4 where we regress the chosen success probabilities on the treatment variable mono-
poly only.
Result 4. On average, subjects invest more in the DUO-SEQ than in the MONO-SEQ treatment,
but the difference is not statistically significant.
The fact that the investment level in the DUO-SEQ treatment is significantly higher than
0.4 is consistent with a positive non-monetary incentive effect of social comparison. How-
ever, the fact that there is no significant difference in average investment behavior between
the DUO-SEQ and the MONO-SEQ treatment suggests that social comparisons alone cannot
explain the statistically highly significant difference in investment behavior observed in the
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Probability chosen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mono -1.029 15.05∗∗∗ 15.05∗∗∗ 28.34∗∗ 15.35∗∗∗ 15.35∗∗∗
(2.647) (4.754) (4.367) (9.811) (4.727) (4.153)
p1, p, resp. 0.0940
∗ 0.0940∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.0975∗ 0.0975∗∗
(0.0545) (0.0439) (0.0884) (0.0530) (0.0375)
Mono × p1, p, resp. -0.305
∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗





Risk aversion -1.735 -1.735
(1.146) (1.103)
Risk aversion quest. 0.0947 0.0947
(0.859) (0.900)
Loss aversion -1.198 -1.198
(0.791) (0.834)




Constant 53.64∗∗∗ 48.68∗∗∗ 48.68∗∗∗ 35.72∗∗∗ 52.90∗∗∗ 52.90∗∗∗
(1.933) (3.418) (2.848) (6.861) (9.870) (9.336)
Restricted to period 1 yes
Clustered by sub sub mg sess sub mg
Observations 2800 2800 2800 140 2800 2800
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.022 0.022 0.058 0.059 0.059
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are
clustered by subject and reported in parentheses. Clustering of standard errors by subject
(sub), matching group (mg) or session (sess) as listed. By including dummy variables for
periods, only the dummy variables for period 1,2 and 13 are slightly significant. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
Table 4: Experiment 2, Determinants of effort invested
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first experiment with simultaneous investments. Thus, strategic uncertainty and complex-
ity seem to be mainly responsible for the effect of an increase of the number of firms on
observed behavior in the first experiment.
However, a Chi-test on independence of the distributions of the probabilities of success
pM and p2 between the treatments rejects the hypothesis of equal investment distributions
across treatments (p < 0.001). Furthermore, the treatment difference becomes significant
in OLS regression (2)-(6) where we control for the probability of success of manager D1,
respectively the probability of adverse market conditions. These regressions show that in
the DUO-SEQ treatment (which is taken as the baseline) the effort p1 of manager D1 has
a significantly positive effect on manager D2’s effort provision. Furthermore, the treatment
variable monopoly has a highly significant and positive effect on the chosen probability,
while monopoly interacted with p has a highly significant negative impact. This result holds
no matter whether we cluster by subject (regression (2)) or by matching group (regression
(3)), or whether we restrict attention to the first period only (regression (4)) in order to ex-
clude any potential effects of repeated interaction. Regressions (5) and (6) show that the
difference in the investment behaviour between treatments is still significant and almost
unchanged if we control for gender, age, measures of risk aversion, loss aversion, and am-
biguity aversion. Only the control variable female has a marginally significant and positive
effect on the chosen probability. There also seems to be no time trend in the data.17
Result 5. In the DUO-SEQ treatment the effort chosen by duopolist D2 depends positively on the
effort chosen by duopolist D1. This effect is highly significant. It is consistent with models of social
comparison that assume a utility loss if manager D2 fails while his competitor succeeds. It is not
consistent with a joy of winning.
This result shows that competition turns the efforts chosen by competing managers
into strategic complements. Subjects try harder the more effort is spent by their compet-
itors. In contrast, an increase in the probability of unfavorable market conditions (which
is materially equivalent to more effort of the competitor) has a discouraging effect and in-
duces a monopolistic manager to reduce his efforts.
17This is confirmed by a regression in which we included dummy variables for each period. Figure A.2 in
the Appendix shows average investments per treatment over periods and also does not indicate a time trend
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Figure 3: Reaction functions p2(p1) and pM(p)
Regression (2) of Table 4 estimates the following reaction functions p2(p1) of manager
D2 and pM(p) of manager M, which are depicted in Figure 3:
p2(p1) = 0.4868 + 9.4 p1 (28)
pM(p) = 0.6373 − 21.1 p (29)
Recall that in both treatments the marginal monetary return of effort is unaffected by the
probability of success of the competitor and the probability of adverse market conditions,
respectively (see Lemma 4). However, subjects react very differently in the two treatments.
In the DUO-SEQ treatment, the higher probability of success of the competitor motivates
duopolist D2 to increase his investment. This effect is reversed in the MONO-SEQ treatment,
in which manager M is discouraged by a high probability of adverse market conditions and
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invests less.18
It is worth noting that the average effort chosen by duopolist D1 is 52.75 which is very
close to (and not statistically different from) the average effort of duopolist D2. If effort
levels are strategic complements, they reinforce each other. Thus, the fact that duopolists
2 are investing more gives an additional incentives to duopolists 1 to invest more as well,
and vice versa.
5.4 Discussion
The two experiments with simultaneous and sequential investments are not directly com-
parable, because we had to change several features of the experimental design at the same
time. Nevertheless, because the difference in average effort levels in MONO-SEQ and DUO-
SEQ are not statistically different, the experiment with sequential investment suggests that
social comparisons alone cannot explain why an increase in the number of competitors has
a large effect on average effort in the first experiment with simultaneous investment. Other
factors such as strategic uncertainty, complexity or risk aversion are likely to play a role,
too. However, social comparisons do have a significant and economically important im-
pact on behavior. A duopolist reacts to a higher effort level of his competitor by spending
significantly more effort himself. The fact that investments are strategic complements sug-
gests that subjects do not want to fall behind rather than like to be ahead. This is consistent
with models of inequality aversion or envy, but not with a joy of winning.
6 Conclusions
The experiments reported in this paper show that there are non-monetary incentive effects
of competition. The number of firms in the market has a causal and highly significant effect
on behavior even though the monetary incentives to invest are unchanged (because of the
18It is possible that the negative effect in the MONO-SEQ treatment is is due to cognitive limitations. The
term “unfavorable market conditions” suggests correctly that expected profits are lower. Some subjects may
have concluded that the returns of their investments are also reduced, even though the marginal incentive
to invest is independent of the probability of unfavorable market conditions. This issue does not arise in the
DUO-SEQ treatment in which market conditions are never mentioned.
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design of the experiments). The first experiment (with simultaneous investments) focuses
on the overall effects of competition. It shows that competition induces experimental sub-
jects to invest more than in a monopolistic situation even if the monetary incentives are
identical. However, competition naturally changes the environment of a decision maker
in several respects. First, with competition there is strategic interaction, so agents have to
form beliefs about the strategies of their opponents. Second, in a competitive environment
decision problems are more complex and more risky. Finally, with more competitors there
is more scope for social comparisons which do not play a role in the case of a monopoly. All
of these effects may partially explain why the number of firms affects managerial incentives
even if there are no monetary incentives in equilibrium.
In the second experiment (with sequential investments) we focus on social comparis-
ons – controlling for all other possible factors of influence. We find that in this case moving
from a monopoly to a duopoly does not induce significantly more effort per se. Thus, so-
cial comparisons alone cannot explain the strong positive effect of additional competitors in
the first experiment. However, the competitive situation turns investments that are (from a
monetary perspective) strategically neutral into strategic complements, i.e. subjects invest
more effort the more effort is invested by their competitors. In contrast, in a monopoly
situation subjects invest less if the probability of adverse market conditions increases, even
though this is payoff equivalent to a higher investment of a competitor in the duopoly mar-
ket. Thus, managers in a duopoly try harder if they are challenged by a competitor, while
the challenge of an unfavorable market induces a manager of a monopolistic firm to be
more complacent.
These non-monetary incentive effects have been largely ignored in the literature so far.
However, they could play an important role for our understanding of why many empir-
ical papers find a positive or an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and
measures of productivity and innovation. Theory suggests that increasing the number of
firms in a market reduces the monetary incentives of each firm and (via the optimal in-
centive scheme) of the firm’s manager to invest in cost reduction. Thus, it is possible that
in some industries the negative monetary incentive effects of competition is dominated by
the positive non-monetary effects.
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These results are only a first step. Much more research is required in order to better
understand how competition affects behavior, how these effects can be modelled, and how
important these effects are in real world settings.
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